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Abstract—Adaptive security aims to protect valuable assets
managed by a system, by applying a varying set of security
controls. Engineering adaptive security is not an easy task. A
set of effective security countermeasures should be identified.
These countermeasures should not only be applied to (primary)
assets that customers desire to protect, but also to other
(secondary) assets that can be exploited by attackers to harm
the primary assets. Another challenge arises when assets vary
dynamically at runtime. To accommodate these variabilities, it
is necessary to monitor changes in assets, and apply the most
appropriate countermeasures at runtime. The paper provides
three main contributions for engineering adaptive security.
First, it proposes a modeling notation to represent primary
and secondary assets, along with their variability. Second,
it describes how to use the extended models in engineering
security requirements and designing required monitoring func-
tions. Third, the paper illustrates our approach through a set
of adaptive security scenarios in the customer domain of a
smart grid. We suggest that modeling secondary assets aids
the deployment of countermeasures, and, in combination with
a representation of assets variability, facilitates the design of
monitoring functions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Software systems are becoming increasingly dynamic
and should adapt at runtime to cope with the variability
of their requirements or the environment in which they
operate. A critical part of adaptation concerns protecting
critical assets of the system from variable threats. Changes in
the protected assets and their corresponding security goals
should also be accommodated. In this paper, we address
proactive adaptive security [1], which tries to prevent attacks
by adjusting security requirements and countermeasures.
Engineering security requirements possesses a number of
challenges. In many cases applying security countermeasures
on the primary assets that have to be protected is not enough.
An attacker may target other secondary assets, which are
related to and can be used to harm their corresponding
primary asset(s). For example, in smart grids, energy related
information (secondary assets) may be exploited to cause
appliances outage (primary assets). Secondary assets are
important in engineering effective security requirements and
countermeasures, since they enable us to identify additional
software components and execution points where security
countermeasures should be instrumented. For example, en-
crypting energy-related information may improve the avail-
ability of the associated appliances. Furthermore, assets in
the protection boundary of the system can vary: the value of
assets can change, new assets can be added or existing assets
can be removed to/from the system. To accommodate these
variabilities and protect assets continuously, it is necessary
to monitor assets changes and adjust countermeasures appro-
priately at runtime. In our earlier work [1], we investigated
the decision making mechanism necessary to reconfigure
countermeasures at runtime. This paper focuses on how to
design and apply the necessary monitoring functions for
primary and secondary assets.
The paper provides three main contributions towards
engineering adaptive security. First, it proposes a modeling
notation to represent primary and secondary assets, along
with their variability. To this end, we extend the goal and
asset models proposed in our earlier work [1]. Second, we
describe how to use the extended models in engineering
security requirements and designing required monitoring
functions. Monitoring functions aim to update the asset
model at runtime. Third, we exemplify our approach through
a set of adaptive security scenarios in the customer domain
of smart grids. We suggest that due to criticality and va-
riety of assets in the smart grid domain, it is suitable for
investigating adaptive security.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
security concerns in smart grids and discusses two adaptation
scenarios. Section 3 describes the asset model and its link
to security goals. Section 4 explains how the asset and goal
models facilitate the deployment of security countermea-
sures and the design of asset monitoring functions. Section
5 reviews related work and, Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. SMART GRID AS AN ADAPTIVE SECURITY DOMAIN
This section explains the main security concerns of smart
grids, and provides two adaptive security scenarios.
1
A. Security in Smart Grids
A smart grid [2] is “a digitally enabled electrical grid
that gathers, distributes, and acts on information about
the behavior of all participants (suppliers and consumers)
in order to improve the efficiency, importance, reliability,
economics, and sustainability of electricity services.” Among
the different domains that compose the architecture of a
smart grid we focus on the customer domain, which is the
most appealing for adaptive security purposes. A simplified
architecture of the customer domain is sketched in Figure 11.
Metering data report which appliances have been used, and
when and how much energy they consumed. Metering data
are transmitted to the internal EMS (Energy Management
System), and to other external domains (e.g., supplier do-
main) through the HAN (Home Area Network) Gateway.
The EMS transmits operational control data to the internal
appliances. It also reads metering data to optimize the load
on the appliances and the energy consumption, especially
during the expensive high-peak periods.
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Figure 1. A simplified architecture of the customer domain.
The customer domain comprises several assets: energy,
meter, EMS, metering data (including energy consumption),
operational control data, audit trail, power-enabled appli-
ances, and assets protected by these appliances. These assets
can be primary or secondary. An asset is primary, when it
is the ultimate object of value to the customer. However,
sometimes a primary asset is not directly accessible to an at-
tacker, who has to turn her/his attention to another secondary
asset to achieve her/his primary objectives. For example,
energy can be a primary asset since a potential attacker may
gain economic advantages by stealing it. However, energy
cannot always be directly stolen by an attacker, who may
have to falsify metering data describing energy consumption,
which are secondary assets in this case. Similarly, a building
(with valuable objects inside) is a primary asset, since an
attacker may wish to steal its goods. So, the attacker may
try to deactivate a CCTV camera that controls the building,
1A complete architectural description of the customer domain
can be found at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html#
NIST-IR-7628.
which is a secondary asset in this case. Secondary assets are
linked to primary assets, since they may carry information
about primary assets (e.g., metering data are primary assets
for energy), or control them (e.g., a CCTV camera is a
secondary asset for the building that is controlled).
B. Adaptive Security Scenarios
This section provides two adaptive security scenarios for
a smart grid. These scenarios deal respectively with the
variability of primary and secondary assets.
Scenario 1. Variability of primary assets may affect the
value of related secondary assets and trigger changes in
the security requirements and countermeasures. Changes in
the asset value can be intrinsic (i.e., determined by the
asset itself). For instance, the value of energy depends on
its daily consumption, and changes in this value directly
affects the value of other secondary assets related to energy
(e.g., metering data and the meter itself). Consequently, in
case the value of energy is low, performing authentication
at the meter is not a critical requirement and a weaker
authentication can be applied. Stronger authentication is
chosen otherwise. The value of assets may also depend on
other contextual factors. For example, the criticality of a
building does not only depend on the goods that are in
it, but also on whether tenants are in the building. This
may also affect the criticality of related secondary assets
and may modify the countermeasures that are applied. For
example, the criticality of the CCTV camera may decrease
when tenants are in the building. Consequently, in case the
criticality of this asset is low, it is not necessary to forbid
operations of remote disconnect, but it is just sufficient
to authorize them. Primary assets can dynamically come
into play, for example when a new appliance is acquired,
and bring new secondary assets, security requirements and
countermeasures. Existing assets can also be removed, for
example, when an appliance is dismissed.
Scenario 2. The value of secondary assets on their own is
not significant for security, but their criticality only depends
on the criticality of their corresponding primary asset(s).
Variability in the secondary assets may take place when
they are added or removed to/from the system. For example,
metering data can be stored in a supplementary device.
In this case, a new secondary asset, associated with this
additional storage device, must be linked to the metering
data. As a consequence, new security requirements must be
associated with this device, and suitable countermeasures
(e.g., authentication and/or encryption) must be applied on
it as well. Similarly, if a CCTV camera is replaced by an
anti-theft sensor, an adaptation is triggered. First, all coun-
termeasures that have been previously applied to the CCTV
camera are removed. Then, a new set of countermeasures
must be applied on the EMS (e.g., encryption of operational
data) to protect its communication with the anti-theft sensor.
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III. ASSET AND GOAL MODELS
To represent all security concerns of a smart grid we
leverage the goal and asset models, presented in earlier
work [1]. Our goal model extends the KAOS model with a
representation of vulnerabilities. The asset model represents
the assets that need to be protected, their mutual relation-
ships, and relates them to the corresponding security goals
to be achieved. The asset model for the scenarios discussed
in the previous section is shown in Figure 2. Each asset is
associated with its secondary assets, if present. As explained
before, a building is a primary asset and CCTV camera is
considered as secondary asset. To turn off or disconnect
appliances, an attacker may modify the operational data sent
by the EMS. Hence, operational data is a secondary asset
with respect to the CCTV camera and the heater. The EMS is
a secondary asset with respect to the operational data, since
an attacker may decide to gain the remote control of the
EMS to violate the integrity of these data. Similarly, energy
cannot be directly targeted by an attack, but its integrity2 can
be damaged by manipulating metering data or compromising
the meter where these data are stored. Hence, metering data
is a secondary asset for energy and meter is a secondary
asset for metering data,
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Figure 2. Asset model in the customer domain of a smart grid.
The goal model for the scenarios described in the previous
section is shown in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 illustrates
the main goals of smart grids, and decomposes them into
functional and non-functional requirements (leaf goals). It
also includes the vulnerabilities of the system, which may
be brought by system operations, including security counter-
measures, and domain assumptions. For example, a CCTV
camera provides a set of standard functions (turn on, turn
off, and replay), and allows users to remotely connect to
it, by using login and logout operations. The operation Turn
Off adds the vulnerability V1, since a malicious attacker may
use it to deactivate video surveillance when the tenants are
not in the building. To foster remote connection, the CCTV
camera must be IP addressable. This domain assumption
2Note that in this case we refer to the integrity of energy consumption.
leads to the vulnerability V2, since a malicious attacker can
remotely gain the control of the camera.
A smart grid must provide metering information. To this
end, a meter should execute the following operations: show
metering data, when required, read energy consumption
log, update its current info, and store them internally. The
operation Store Info introduces the vulnerability V3, since
metering data may be read and manipulated by a malicious
attacker. Remote connection is also supported by the meter,
through login and logout operations. The operation Login
introduces the vulnerability V4, since unauthorized attackers
can remotely connect to it. Operational data must be also
transmitted to the appliances to balance their load. To this
end, the EMS must read energy usage, compute operational
data and send them to the appliances. The operation Send
Op Data is based on the domain assumption that data
are transmitted through a wireless channel (Wireless). This
assumption introduces the vulnerability V5, since messages
sent over the wireless channel may be intercepted and
modified by an attacker.
Figure 4 illustrates the security goals related to our
scenarios, namely, availability and integrity, and associates
each of them with the assets to be protected (in squared
brackets). Security goals have a hierarchical structure and
are decomposed into security requirements (leaf goals) and
countermeasures. Each countermeasure is related to the
vulnerabilities it tries to mitigate. For example, the goal
Availability[CCTV] is decomposed into requirements SR2
(authorize remote disconnect) and SR3 (remote access to
the CCTV camera must be authenticated). Requirement SR2
can be achieved by using different countermeasures (e.g.,
forbid remote disconnect to all or grant it just to the admin
user). These countermeasures mitigate the vulnerability V1.
Requirement SR3 can be achieved by applying proper au-
thentication mechanisms (e.g., single factor or multi-factor)
to remotely access to this appliance. These countermeasures
mitigate the vulnerability V2. The priority of security goals
also depends on the value of the primary assets that need
to be protected. For example, the priority of the goal Avail-
ability[CCTV] depends on the value of the CCTV camera
and any change in its priority may lead to the selection of
a different set of countermeasures. In case the criticality of
a CCTV camera is low, remote disconnect can be granted
to a certain set of users. In case a CCTV camera is highly
critical, remote disconnect can be denied for all users.
To support availability of appliances, it is also necessary
to guarantee the integrity of their secondary assets (e.g.,
operational control data). In particular, each appliance must
accept only operational control data coming from trusted
sources (e.g., IP addresses) (SR7). These data must always
report values (e.g. voltage) within a certain range (SR8),
to avoid power outages. The countermeasures associated
with SR7 and SR8 mitigate the vulnerability V5. To prevent
energy theft, it is necessary to support the integrity of me-
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Figure 3. Goal model for the customer domain of smart grid.
tering data. For example, the amount of energy consumption
must correspond to the energy consumed by the referenced
appliance (SR5). The time of usage must correspond to the
time when the referenced appliance was active (SR6). The
countermeasures associated with SR5 and SR6 mitigate the
vulnerability V3. To prevent energy theft, it is also necessary
to foster integrity of the meter, which is a secondary asset for
metering data, and, to this aim, the connection to the meter
must be authenticated (SR9). A maximum number of consec-
utive invalid login attempts that a user can perform during
a time period must be fixed (SR10). The countermeasures
associated with these requirements mitigate the vulnerability
V4. The link between assets and security goals along with
the goal decomposition allows us to identify how and where
countermeasures should be applied to satisfy their security
goals. For example, the goal Integrity[Energy] depends on
the integrity of Metering Data, which, in its turn, must be
achieved by enforcing authentication at the Meter (SR9).
In case a security goal or requirement is not associated
with any asset, it automatically inherits the assets associated
with its father. For example, SR7 is directly associated with
Operational Data.
IV. ENGINEERING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND
MONITORING FUNCTIONS
This section explains how secondary assets can be used
to engineer security requirements and monitoring functions.
A. Engineering Security Requirements
To engineer security requirements it is necessary to de-
velop their corresponding security countermeasures. These
may avoid the execution of an operation, perform a set of
actions before and/or after executing an operation, or modify
the input and/or the output parameters of an operation. In this
paper we do not automatically infer the implementation of
the countermeasures, but we use secondary assets to identify
the execution points where they have to be performed.
A possible way to implement security countermeasures
is through AOP (Aspect Oriented Programming) [3], which
allows us to inject existing security countermeasures (ad-
vices) at specific execution points (join points). Pointcuts
can also be defined to group together a set of join points.
We use AspectJ [4] to define the pointcuts used for our
smart grid scenarios. For example, the following pointcut
counterm identifies the execution points necessary to
perform a countermeasure, when an operation (op1) is
called on a target object (obj). We assume that op1 is the
operation that brings the vulnerability we want to mitigate.
pointcut counterm(Obj obj): target(obj)
&& call(* * op1(...));
In case an aspect denies the execution of an operation, the
join point must be applied around the execution of that
operation. This is the case, for example, of countermeasure
Grant to admin, which may only allow the admin to perform
an operation of remote disconnect on the CCTV camera. In
this case, the following join point and advice is used.
around(Obj obj, int x): counterm(obj, x){
...
if(admin) proceeds(x); }
The advice code will check the credential of the user, and,
in case the user is the administrator, it proceeds with
the code of the intercepted operation (i.e., turn off).
Otherwise, the advice will return the control to the caller.
In this case, the target object is the CCTV camera , which
is the secondary asset associated with this countermeasure
(see the parent goal Availability[CCTV] in Figure 4), and
brings vulnerability V1 that we are trying to mitigate.
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Figure 4. Security goals, requirements and countermeasures for the customer domain of smart grid.
In case an aspect performs some additional actions
(advice-code) before or after the execution of the orig-
inal operation, the following pointcuts/advices are respec-
tively defined.
before/after(Obj obj, int x): counterm(obj, x){
advice-code }
A before pointcut can be used for countermeasure Check
Appliance Was Active. In this case, the operations in
advice-code control whether an appliance was active at
the time claimed by the metering data. The target object
is the software component that manipulates metering data,
which is the secondary asset associated with this counter-
measure (see the parent goal Integrity[Metering Data]).
If an aspect modifies the input parameters of an
operation, it must keep a reference to its input in
its signature (x) and must perform additional actions
(before-advice-code(x)) to modify parameter x and
put into a new variable (y). The original operation is subse-
quently called by providing the new input (proceed(y)).
The output parameter (z) of the original operation can be
also further manipulated and returned by the advice.
int around(Obj obj, int x): counterm(m, x){
int y =before-advice-code(x)
int z = proceed(y);
z = after-advice-code(z);
return z; }
This template is adopted for example when we want
to encrypt metering data before the store data operation
at the meter, to mitigate vulnerability V4, and guarantee
the integrity of energy. In this case, the operations in
before-advice-code will encrypt the input data and
will call the store data operation, without performing the
operations in after-advice-code. The target object of
this operation is the meter.
B. Engineering Monitoring Functions
Since we want to protect critical assets proactively, in
this paper monitoring functions are not aimed to detect the
occurrence of attacks. Instead, these update the values of
primary assets depending on a set of contextual factors and
propagate these values onto the corresponding secondary
assets. Both contextual factors and secondary asset rela-
tionships are immediately derived from the asset model.
Contextual factors can be fixed or mutable. Fixed factors
do not change at runtime and, indeed, do not need to be
monitored, although they can be manually modified. On the
other hand, mutable factors can change dynamically and
must be continuously tracked at runtime. Each factor has
a value comprised 0 and 1, and impacts on the value of
its corresponding asset with a certain weight. The value of
an asset is computed by performing a weighted sum of the
contributions of all its factors.
A model of the monitoring functions necessary for our
example is provided in Figure 5. The criticality of the
Building depends on factors F1 and F2. F1 is associated
with the value of the goods that are in the building. It is a
fixed factor, since, for simplicity, we assume that the goods
in the building do not vary frequently. It can be eventually
modified by the system administrator, for example, when a
new device (e.g., computer) is installed in the building. F2 is
related to the location of the tenant and it is a mutable factor.
F1 and F2 have respectively weights 0.7 and 0.3, since F1
is more important to determine due to the criticality of the
building. The value of Energy is associated with a mutable
factor (F3), which is related to its daily consumption (dc).
The value of mutable factors depends on the satisfaction
of some mutually exclusive constraints, which must be
monitored with a certain frequency. Monitoring can be
performed punctually (i.e., every time the data, on which
the constraint depends, change), or with a certain frequency
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(e.g., every second, minute, and so on). For example, factor
F2 (tenant’s location) is associated with constraints C1 and
C2. C1 verifies whether the tenant is in the building (e.g.,
the coordinates of her/his location are within those that
delimit the building), while C2 verifies the contrary. These
constraints are checked every 10 minutes. In case C1 is
satisfied, the value assigned to F1 is 0.5, and is 1.0 oth-
erwise. Factor F3 (daily energy consumption) is associated
with constraints C3, C4, and C5. They respectively verify
whether dc < 5kW , dc ∈ [5, 15) kW , or dc ≥ 15kW .
These constraints are monitored daily and, in case one of
them is satisfied, the value assigned to F3 is 0.25, 0.5 and
1.0, respectively. Secondary assets are valuable since they
are the “means” to harm their associated primary assets.
For this reason, secondary assets inherit the value of their
corresponding primary asset(s) and must be protected as
well. For example, a CCTV camera acquires the same value
of the associated building.
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Figure 5. Monitoring functions of the smart grids example.
V. RELATED WORK
We are not aware of any work on adaptive security in the
smart grid domain. Most of the research efforts have inves-
tigated attack-oriented approaches to adaptive security (e.g.,
intrusion detection and tolerance). Debar et al. [5] define the
goal of intrusion detection systems as “to discover breaches
of security, attempted breaches, or open vulnerabilities that
could lead to potential breaches”. They also mention the
possibility of applying countermeasures after attack detec-
tion. Julisch [6] uses root cause analysis to identify why
an intrusion detection system raises alarms. The ultimate
goal of this work is to reduce the number of alarms to be
notified to users. Atighetchi et al. [7] target intrusion toler-
ance through strategies such as replicating key application
components, attack containment and unpredictable change
of configurations. Weise [8] listed several goals for adaptive
security, including reducing remediation time, decreasing
attack velocity and shrinking the attack surface. None of
these works uses asset modeling and runtime monitoring to
prevent attacks. Instead, existing solutions mainly address
attack detection and reaction.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed an approach to support adaptive
security by explicitly modeling assets and linking them to
their corresponding security goals. We also introduced the
concept of secondary assets, which denotes assets that may
be directly targeted by an attack to indirectly harm other
primary assets. Secondary assets, along with an explicit
representation of vulnerabilities, help engineering security
requirements and the deployment of security countermea-
sures. Representing the variability of assets facilitates the
design of asset monitoring functions. We used the smart grid
as an application domain to demonstrate our approach.
We are planning to integrate our approach with the deci-
sion making mechanism we built in earlier work [1]. We also
intend to improve monitoring functions with explicit support
for detecting new vulnerabilities, for example, by monitoring
domain assumptions. Finally, we will further investigate how
to apply monitoring functions for reactive adaptation in order
to detect occurrences of attacks.
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